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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the manufacture of gas created 
dangerous and contaminating byproducts.1 The raw coal and oil used to make gas 
produced, among other things, tar and heavy metals that were often released into the 
soil and groundwater near the manufacturing plants.2 In the early twenty-first 
century, one gas company, New York State Electric and Gas Corp. (“NYSEGC”), 
took responsibility for the environmental mess and spent over twenty-five million 
dollars cleaning up contamination on its various production sites.3 The NYSEGC 
was not the only party to blame for the contamination and it expected to recover part 
of its costs from other gas companies that had polluted the sites.4 In the end, however, 
NYSEGC was stuck with the entire bill.5 NYSEGC was unable to bring state claims 
against the other responsible parties because a New York district court found state 
claims to be preempted by the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).6
 Is it fair that a New York company that provided a much-needed and expensive 
service by cleaning up state land was not permitted to avail itself of New York law 
and bring state claims to recover its expenditures, when others were partially 
responsible? What company would voluntarily perform these costly but necessary 
cleanups if it would ultimately be responsible for the entire cost despite its liability 
for only a portion of the damage?
 This note asserts that CERCLA should not preempt all New York state claims 
brought by plaintiffs that have performed cleanups of hazardous waste for cost 
recovery or contribution. The various “savings clauses” 7 throughout CERCLA and 
New York federal district court rulings interpreting the legislation show that 
Congress did not intend to preempt all state claims. State claims that are not in 
conflict with CERCLA—those that do not disrupt the federal contribution scheme 
laid out in section 113(f) or allow for double recovery under state and federal law—
should be allowed to stand alongside CERCLA claims.8 New York state causes of 
1. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., No. 3:03-CV-0438, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35141, 
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 11, 2007).
2. See id.
3. See id. at *3–4. 
4. See id. at *4–6. 
5. See id. at *40.
6. Id.
7. The “savings clauses” in CERCLA legislation operate to specifically disclaim preemption of state laws 
regulating hazardous substances. See Downey Brand Attorneys LLP, 030701_CERCLA, http://www.
downeybrand.com/publications/articles/030701_CERCLA.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). Congress 
intended, with the inclusion of the “savings clauses,” to leave room for states to create laws that 
supplement CERCLA so long as they do not interfere with the federal government’s objectives. See id. 
8. The federal contribution scheme laid out in section 113(f) encourages responsible parties to admit their 
liability and agree to a cost settlement with the government. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006). Under section 113(f), a party that enters 
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action that allow for relief that is unavailable under or supplemental to the federal 
system should be available to plaintiffs who clean up hazardous waste.
 Part II, section A, of this note describes the environmental catastrophes that led 
to the development of CERCLA and the federal Superfund program that finances 
and enforces the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Part II, section B, examines both 
the government’s “Enforcement First” policy that asks the parties responsible for the 
hazardous waste to finance the cleanup and the types of costs that are recoverable 
under CERCLA claims. Part III describes the federal legislation and interpretive 
case law that regulates who may sue for cost recovery or contribution and under what 
circumstances they may do so. Part III also stresses the importance to parties that 
have financed cleanups of determining whether state causes of action exist as 
alternative routes to federal recovery. Part IV of this note analyzes the savings clauses 
built into CERCLA. Part V discusses several New York federal district court cases 
that considered the issue of whether CERCLA preempts state claims for cost recovery 
and contribution. Part V also refutes the idea that state causes of action always disrupt 
the federal settlement scheme in CERCLA section 113(f) or allow for double 
recovery under state and federal law. Finally, Part VI argues that both congressional 
intent and sound policy support federal preemption of only those state claims that 
interfere with the federal settlement scheme or allow for double recovery.
ii. histOrY
 A. The Emergence of CERCLA and the Superfund Program
 Several major environmental catastrophes led to the enactment of CERCLA. 
One of the most widely known is the Love Canal disaster. In the early 1900s, a man 
named William Love dug a canal between the upper and lower Niagara Rivers in an 
effort to generate cheap energy.9 The project f lopped, and the canal was turned into 
an industrial chemical dumpsite.10 From 1942 to 1953, the Hooker Chemical 
Company dumped over 20,000 tons of chemical waste into the abandoned canal.11 In 
1953, Hooker Chemical covered the canal, which was completely filled with chemical 
waste, and sold the land to the Niagara Falls School Board for one dollar.12 In the 
into a settlement agreement with the government gains not only the right to sue other responsible parties 
to recover its costs but also protection from subsequent contribution actions brought against it for matters 
addressed in the settlement. See id; see also Lawrence Schnapf, Managing Environmental Liability: 
Business Transactions and Brownfield Redevelopment, 5-124 (Juris Publ’g, Inc. 2008). 
9. See Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J. (Jan. 1979), available at http://www.epa.gov/
history/topics/lovecanal/01.html.
10. Id.
11. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Occidental to Pay $129 Million in 
Love Canal Settlement (Dec. 21, 1995), available at http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=e
n&q=epa&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8.
12. Beck, supra note 9.
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late 1950s, an elementary school and several residential neighborhoods were built on 
top of the filled-in canal.13
 Lois Gibbs and her husband were among the many young parents seeking a nice, 
working-class neighborhood in which to raise their children when they moved to the 
Love Canal area.14 Like many of their new neighbors, the Gibbs children often fell 
ill. Children in the area experienced frequent asthma problems and urinary tract 
infections and suffered from epilepsy, birth defects, liver problems, and suppressed 
immune systems.15
 The illnesses were found to be a direct result of exposure to the chemical waste 
on which the Love Canal community was built.16 Then-Governor of New York 
Hugh Carey decided the state would purchase the homes in the area17 and close the 
local school.18 President Jimmy Carter declared the Love Canal a federal disaster 
area in 1978, and over 900 families were relocated.19
 In response to this and other environmental disasters, in 1980, Congress passed 
CERCLA, which created a “federal mechanism for expeditiously cleaning up 
hazardous waste sites.”20 Under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) was directed to compile a list of contaminated sites, finance the cleanup of 
those sites using the $1.6 billion Superfund trust, and identify parties that should be 
held liable for cleanup costs.21 Overall, it “gave the federal government broad authority 
to regulate hazardous substances, to respond to hazardous substance emergencies, 
and to develop long-term solutions for the Nation’s most serious hazardous waste 
problems.”22 The law created a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries, the 
13. Id.; Lauren Brois, Lois Gibbs: Bringing the Love Canal to New Paltz, New Paltz Oracle, Nov. 15, 2007, 
http://www.newpaltz.edu/oracle/article.cfm?Id.=3396.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Jenny Rizzo, On the 30th Anniversary of Toxic Nightmare, Former Love Canal Residents Ask State to Do 
More, WKBW, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.wkbw.com/news/local/26200084.html; Beck, supra note 9.
16. See Beck, supra note 9; Jenny Rizzo, 30 Year Anniversary of Love Canal: Missed Opportunities, Aug. 3, 
2008, available at http://www.wkbw.com/news/local/26223299.html. That there was a problem was 
increasingly clear. Indeed, residents reported that they could actually see the waste oozing up from the 
ground and into their homes. Id.
17. Beck, supra note 9.
18. New York State Department of Health, Love Canal: A Special Report to the Governor & 
Legislature: April 1981, available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/investigations/
love_canal/lcreport.htm#relocation.
19. Id; see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, RCRA Orientation Manual VI-10 (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ osw/inforesources/pubs/orientat/rom.pdf.
20. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-1. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, CERCLA Overview, http://epa.gov/
superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last visited June 3, 2009); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Basic Information, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited June 3, 2009). 
21. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-1.
22. Environment, Health and Safety Online, CERCLA: Purpose and Organization, http://www.ehso.
com/superfund.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). See Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-1. 
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proceeds of which went to the Superfund trust for conducting cleanups of hazardous 
waste sites.23
 CERCLA initiatives progressed slowly, and Congress decided to dramatically 
expand the program in 1986 with the passage of the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).24 These amendments increased state involvement as 
well as the focus on human health problems caused by hazardous waste, and provided 
new enforcement and settlement tools.25 Most significantly, Congress increased the 
Superfund trust to $8.5 billion, giving the EPA substantially more resources to clean 
up environmental waste sites.26
 B. CERCLA’s “Enforcement First” Policy
 As amended, CERCLA gives the federal government broad remedial power to 
deal with hazardous waste. One of the EPA’s main goals under CERCLA, its 
“Enforcement First” policy,27 is to identify those responsible for the hazardous waste 
and charge them with the cleanup costs of contaminated sites. The EPA can order 
these potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”)28 to clean up the sites, or it can negotiate 
23. See CERCLA: Purpose and Organization, supra note 22; See also CERCLA Overview, supra note 20; 
Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-1.
24. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-1.
25. See id. 
26. Id. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, SARA Overview (2007), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/sara.htm. 
The toxic waste in the Love Canal area, discussed earlier, was cleaned up using Superfund money, and 
the federal government was subsequently reimbursed through a settlement by the responsible chemical 
corporation. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Occidental to Pay $129 Million in Love Canal 
Settlement (Dec. 21, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/December95/638.txt.
html. The Love Canal was not de-listed from the Superfund program until 2004, evidencing the 
magnitude of the cleanup project. See Delisting Love Canal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2004, at A22, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/opinion/delisting-love-canal.html?scp=1&sq=Delisting%20
Love%20Canal&st=cse (explaining that “Delisting Love Canal is a way of saying that the area is clean, 
the event over, history done, though the agency has promised to monitor the site and intervene with 
additional cleanup if necessary”).
27. See Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance, and Marianne Lamont Horinko, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 
Response, on Enforcement First for Remedial Action at Superfund Sites, to Reg’l Adm’rs (Sept. 20, 
2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/enffirst-mem.
pdf; Finding PRPs, Compliance and Enforcement, U.S. EPA, Finding Potentially Responsible Parties 
(July 27, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/cleanup/superfund/find.html. See generally CERCLA: 
Purpose and Organization, supra note 22.
28. Only PRPs face CERCLA liability. The CERCLA recognizes four classes of PRPs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of 
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or 
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) 
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal 
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settlements with PRPs to fund the cleanup and take legal action against them if they 
fail to do so.29 If the government finances a cleanup using the Superfund, it can later 
sue the PRPs to recover the costs under section 107(a)(4).30
 In brief, the EPA’s policy is to reserve Superfund money for the cleanup of 
contamination that cannot be attributed to specific parties at the time of cleanup of 
the contaminated site. When a polluter can be identified, the EPA’s stance is that the 
polluter should either finance the cleanup when the cleanup remains to be done, or, 
should reimburse the Superfund for the costs of cleanup already incurred.31 This 
policy promotes a “polluter pays” principle and conserves the resources of the 
Superfund to clean up contaminated sites for which no viable PRP can be located.32
 One consequence of the EPA’s Enforcement First policy is that the party that 
enters into a cleanup agreement with the EPA may not be the only party liable for 
the contamination. The financing party can attempt to recoup portions of the cleanup 
costs from other PRPs through CERCLA liability claims. CERCLA, however, only 
allows for recovery of the response costs outlined in the National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, more commonly known as the National 
Contingency Plan (“NCP”).33
 The United States first developed the NCP in 1968 after an oil tanker spilled 
more than thirty-seven million gallons of crude oil into waters off the coast of 
England.34 The plan provided the first set of guidelines and procedures that were 
used to report and respond to any release or threatened release of oil or hazardous 
substances.35 After CERCLA was passed in 1980, the NCP was broadened to include 
a framework for responding to hazardous substance spills as well as oil spills, and 
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which 
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, 
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action 
incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent 
with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred 
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) damages for 
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of 
assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the 
costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 104(i) 
[42 USCS § 9604(i)].
 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
29. See Memorandum, Enforcement First for Remedial Action at Superfund Sites, supra note 27.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). This provision allows both government and private parties that have contributed 
to a cleanup to bring cost recovery actions against parties partially or wholly responsible for hazardous 
waste.
31. Memorandum, Enforcement First for Remedial Action at Superfund Sites, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2008).
34. This was the now infamous Torrey Canyon tanker. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/
content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). 
35. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-37; CERCLA: Purpose and Organization, supra note 22.
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provide for emergency removal actions of hazardous waste.36 Its stated purpose is to 
“provide the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding 
to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants.”37 Overall, the NCP outlines the steps the government must take in 
cleaning up hazardous waste and is the “primary regulation of the Superfund 
program.”38
 Additionally, the NCP specifies which types of costs a party may recover under a 
federal action from other responsible parties. Recoverable costs are limited to 
“necessary” response costs that are “consistent” with the NCP,39 meaning that in 
order for a party to recover its costs, its response action must be in “substantial 
compliance” with NCP procedural requirements and result in a “CERCLA-quality 
cleanup.”40 Some common examples of costs that courts have awarded to plaintiffs 
under CERCLA actions include “expenses for site investigations, . . . well plugging, 
site maintenance, and providing alternative water supplies.”41
iii. prObLEM
 Sometimes, a party may pay for cleanup activities that are not “consistent” with 
the NCP, and are therefore not recoverable under federal CERCLA claims. A private 
party may not know what costs will later be found “consistent” with the NCP before 
the cleanup takes place. Because CERCLA fails to define the term, there has been a 
great deal of litigation as to what costs are in fact “necessary,” and the burden falls on 
the private plaintiff to prove consistency with the NCP.42 Further, the NCP does not 
provide for personal injury claims or private property damage.43 These and other costs 
found to be inconsistent with the NCP may, however, be recoverable under state law.
 A party incurring cleanup costs can attempt to recoup some or all of the costs 
from other PRPs under two different CERCLA claims. Although in its original form 
CERCLA did not contain an express right of contribution among PRPs,44 in the early 
years of CERCLA litigation several courts found an implied private right of action for 
parties seeking reimbursement of their cleanup costs under section 107(a)(4)(B).45 In 
36. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
Overview, supra note 34.
37. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1. 
38. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Frequently Asked Questions, “What is the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP)?,” http://epa.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/epa.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(2).
40. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i); see infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text.
41. See Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-45.
42. See id. at 5-45 to -46.
43. See id. at 5-44.
44. Id. at 5-93.
45. Id; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs. Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 162 (2004). 
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1986, Congress added section 113(f)(1) to CERCLA, which created an express right 
of contribution.46
 A section 107(a)(4)47 private cost recovery action and a section 113(f)(1)48 
contribution action are significantly different claims. A successful section 107(a)(4)(B) 
claim results in joint- and several-indemnity liability.49 Thus under section 107(a)(4), 
a plaintiff may seek to recover the entirety of its response costs from the defendant. 
A section 107(a)(4) judgment, therefore, can result in a one hundred percent shifting 
of the costs of the cleanup from the party that initially financed it to the party found 
liable under 107(a)(4).50 Conversely, under section 113(f)(1), liability is several, 
meaning that a court may allocate liability among PRPs according to the court’s 
opinion of the proportionality of blame among the PRPs.51
46. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-93. Plaintiffs bringing a section 113(f) action have a right to contribution 
from other PRPs that is several, not joint, allowing courts to apportion liability among PRPs using 
equitable factors. In other words, a right of contribution allows a suing party to collect contribution 
from other responsible parties in accordance with their equitable share of the blame. Id. at 5-93 to -94. 
In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court succinctly stated, “[i]n short, after SARA, CERCLA provided 
for a right to cost recovery in certain circumstances, § 107(a), and separate rights to contribution in 
other circumstances, §§ 113(f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B).” 543 U.S. at 163.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2006). Section 9607 states:
 (a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; “comparable 
maturity” date. Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to 
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section . . . .
 (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for . . . .
 (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with 
the national contingency plan.
 Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Section 9613 states:
 (f) Contribution.
 (1) Contribution. Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable under section 107(a) [42 USCS § 9607(a)], during or following any 
civil action under section 106 [42 USCS § 9606] or under section 107(a) [42 USCS § 
9607(a)]. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution 
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable 
factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall 
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a 
civil action under section 106 or section 107 [42 USCS § 9606 or 9607].
 Id.
49. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-93.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5-94.
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 Initially, federal courts disagreed about the circumstances under which plaintiffs 
could sue under each cause of action.52 Specifically, courts grappled with the question 
of whether the addition of an express cause of action for several liability in section 
113(f)(1) preempted the section 107(a)(4) implied cause of action for complete 
indemnity. Some courts held that the section 107(a)(4) claim of complete indemnity 
had been swallowed by the claim of several liability in section 113(f)(1),53 while other 
courts held that each section provided a distinct cause of action.54
 With the development of voluntary cleanup agreements in the mid-1990s came 
many section 113(f)(1) actions seeking recovery for response costs from other PRPs 
after a voluntary cleanup.55 Most courts agreed that only “innocent parties” that had 
not been sued by the government under CERCLA sections 106 or 107, and thus 
were not potentially or actually liable to the government, could bring section 107(a)(4) 
cost recovery actions.56
 The issue was ultimately resolved in 2004 when the Supreme Court, in Cooper 
Industries v. Aviall Services, Inc., limited the right of contribution under section 113(f) 
for many PRPs.57 Cooper Industries (“Cooper”) had sold several aircraft engine 
maintenance sites in Texas to Aviall in 1981.58 Years later, Aviall discovered that 
both it and Cooper had contaminated the sites with petroleum and other hazardous 
substances that leaked into the ground through underground storage tank spills.59 
Aviall entered into a voluntary cleanup program with the state in order to avoid an 
enforcement action, and cleaned up the properties under state supervision.60 Aviall 
subsequently brought an action against Cooper to recover Cooper’s share of the 
response costs.61
 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas stated that a plaintiff could only bring a 
section 113(f)(1) contribution action “during or following” its involvement in a civil 
enforcement action brought by the government.62 In other words, a plaintiff cannot 
bring a section 113(f)(1) suit against another party unless the party seeking contribution 
has first been sued by the government under sections 106 or 107 or has entered into an 
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Sun Company v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997)).
54. Id. (citing United States v. SCA Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Chesapeake 
& Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal, Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992)).
55. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-95.
56. Id. at 5-96.
57. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
58. Id. at 163.
59. Id. at 163–64. 
60. Id. at 164.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 166.
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administrative or judicially approved settlement under section 113(f)(2),63 resolving its 
liability to the government.64 However, the Court left open the issue of whether section 
107 was similarly limited or whether it allowed all PRPs to sue for cost recovery.
 A year later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed that question 
in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., when it allowed a party 
that conducted a voluntary cleanup to bring a section 107 action.65 The New York 
State Department of Environmental Conservation (“NYDEC”) had approached 
Consolidated Edison (“Con Ed”) about cleaning up contamination on properties 
where it or its predecessors had owned manufactured gas plants.66 Con Ed entered 
into a voluntary agreement with NYDEC to clean up more than one hundred of 
these sites.67 Prior to entering into the voluntary agreement, Con Ed brought suit 
under section 113(f)(1) against UGI, a corporation that Con Ed alleged owned and 
operated ten of the sites in question, to recover costs it had incurred and would incur 
in cleaning up those properties.68 The court examined whether the voluntary cleanup 
agreement was an administrative settlement, which would allow Con Ed to bring an 
action under section 113(f)(3),69 and, if not, whether Con Ed could nonetheless 
maintain a section 107(a)(4)(B) claim against UGI.70
 The Second Circuit found that the voluntary cleanup agreement was not a 
settlement agreement under section 113(f) because it did not resolve CERCLA 
liability.71 But the court ruled that Con Ed could still recover under section 107(a) 
for “necessary response costs incurred voluntarily, not under a court or administrative 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006). Under this provision, a party that has resolved its liability with the 
government through an administrative or judicially approved settlement agreement may not be sued 
again for the same costs in a federal contribution action. Id. Under section 113(f)(3), settling parties may 
bring contribution claims against non-settling parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3).
64. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Availl Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
65. 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
66. See id. at 93.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 93–94; see Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-98.
69. Section 113(f)(3)(B) states that a party that “has resolved its [federal] liability . . . in an administrative 
or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not a party to a 
settlement.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2006). In other words, in order to encourage parties to admit 
liability and expedite cleanup projects, a party’s right to seek contribution from other PRPs under 
section 113(f)(3) attaches only once the party has settled its own liability with the government and 
promises to pay its portion of the cleanup costs. See Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-101. In Consolidated 
Edison, the court had to determine whether the voluntary cleanup agreement was an administrative 
settlement that resolved CERCLA liability under section 113(f)(3), and whether Con Ed could properly 
bring a contribution suit against UGI. See Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 95–96.
70. Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 97; see Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-98 to -99. 
71. Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 97. There is a comprehensive line of cases interpreting section 113(f)(3)(B) 
and what constitutes an “administrative settlement.” See Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-104. Before Cooper 
Indus., many courts held that an agreement must satisfy the procedural and due process requirements of 
the CERCLA provision, section 122, governing settlements. Id. Since this issue was not before the 
Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, there is still no clear consensus on whether a party who has entered 
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order or judgment,” even if Con Ed would have been liable for those expenses had it 
been sued by the government under that same section.72 The court reasoned that 
prohibiting section 107(a)(4) recovery in such situations would discourage voluntary 
cleanups.73 The court also recognized that although allowing a party to bring a 
section 107(a) action for voluntary cleanup could result in complete indemnification 
of a party that may actually be liable for some of the costs, a defending party could 
still bring a section 113(f)(1) counterclaim to offset the contribution owed.74
 Shortly after the Second Circuit found an implied right of contribution under 
section 107(a)(4), the Seventh and Eighth Circuits found such a right as well.75 
However, the Third Circuit rejected the existence of any implied right.76 When the 
issue came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the 
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation and ruled that a PRP that has 
performed a voluntary cleanup may seek cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B).77
 In Atlantic Research Corp., the company (“Atlantic”) leased a facility owned and 
operated by the U.S. Department of Defense, at which it retrofitted rocket motors 
and sprayed engines with high-pressure water hoses.78 Over time, the water 
contaminated the soil and groundwater.79 Atlantic cleaned up the hazardous 
contamination and then brought suit against the U.S. government under both 
sections 107(a)(4) and 113(f)(1).80
into an agreement with a state or federal environmental agency may bring section 113(f) contribution 
claims. Id.
72. Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 100.
73. Id. The Second Circuit stated, “[w]ere this economic disincentive in place such parties would likely wait 
until they are sued to commence cleaning up any site for which they are not exclusively responsible 
because of their inability to be reimbursed for cleanup expenditures in the absence of a suit.” Id.
74. Id. at 100 n.9; see Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-99. In other words, because liability under section 107(a) 
is joint and several, a plaintiff suing under that section can seek to recover the entirety of its response 
costs from a defendant even if it is actually responsible for some of the costs. Id. In order to prevent such 
a plaintiff ’s unjust enrichment, the Second Circuit reasoned that the defendant sued under section 107(a) 
was not barred from then bringing its own section 113(f)(1) counterclaim against the plaintiff for 
contribution to offset the inequitable judgment. Id.
75. See Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-99 (citing Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 92; Metropolitan Water 
Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824 
(7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
76. See Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-99 (citing E.I. Dupont de Numours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 
515 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
77. 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
78. Id. at 133.
79. Id; see also Richard Porter, Shifting the Costs of Environmental Housekeeping: An Additional Way to Receive 
Contribution for Contaminated Site Cleanup, 27-1 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 42, 42 (2008).
80. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 133.
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 The issue in Atlantic Research Corp. was whether the meaning of the phrase “any 
other person” 81 in section 107(a)(4)(B) created a claim for “innocent” parties—those 
without any potential liability to the government.82 Like the plaintiff in Consolidated 
Edison, Atlantic performed its cleanup voluntarily, not under a recognized CERCLA 
settlement agreement with the government.83 The Court ruled that section 107 
created a separate cost recovery action, one distinct from a section 113(f)(1) right of 
contribution.84 While section 113(f)(1) involves an action for contribution among 
PRPs with common liability, section 107 involves a cost recovery action for PRPs 
that have voluntarily incurred cleanup costs.85 The Court held that Atlantic was 
allowed to sue the U.S. government to recover its voluntary cleanup costs under 
section 107.86
 Following the trend set by the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison, the Supreme 
Court announced an important rule in Atlantic Research Corp.: Parties that have performed 
cleanups may only sue for contribution from other PRPs under section 113(f)(1) if the 
party seeking contribution was first sued by the government, whereas only “innocent” 
parties, those whose cleanup was voluntary, can sue for indemnification under section 
107(a)(4)(B).87 Thus, the Supreme Court first narrowed the right of contribution in 
Cooper Industries, and then provided an alternative avenue of relief under CERCLA 
in Atlantic Research Corp.88
 Clearly, federal routes to recovery are restricted—only certain plaintiffs can sue 
for certain types of relief, and the only relief available at all is for cleanup costs 
consistent with the NCP. Additionally, Atlantic Research Corp. left open the question of 
whether parties who have entered into consent decrees,89 or parties ordered by the EPA 
to respond to section 106(a) unilateral cleanup orders,90 may sue under sections 107(a)(4) 
81. Section 107(a)(4)(B) in full refers to “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B) (2006).
82. Id; see Michael H. Reed, Toxins-Are-Us: Supreme Court’s Recent CERCLA Decision Could Affect Bankruptcy 
Cases, 26-8 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 40, 40 (2007).
83. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 133.
84. Id. at 138; see also Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-100.
85. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S at 138–39; Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-100; Porter, supra note 79, at 
42–43.
86. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 141.
87. See id. at 138–40.
88. See Porter, supra note 79, at 42–43.
89. Consent decrees are court-approved legal agreements between the federal government and PRPs 
mandating cleanups. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Types of Superfund Settlements, http://www.epa.gov/
oecaerth/cleanup/superfund/neg-type.html#aoc (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
90. If the PRP does not agree to perform cleanup work or refuses to perform work agreed to in an earlier 
settlement agreement, the EPA can order the PRP to perform cleanup work through a Unilateral 
Administrative Order (UAO). U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund Unilateral Orders, http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/cleanup/superfund/orders.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). The EPA “can issue a UAO 
when it finds there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or the 
environment.” Id.
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or 113(f)(1).91 In such situations, a party is invited or ordered to finance a cleanup, 
and that party’s response costs are compelled by the government—they are neither 
“voluntary” nor paid as judgments in sections 106 or 107(a)(4) enforcement actions. 
Thus, Atlantic Research Corp. provided some answers as to what types of claims PRPs 
could bring, but it did not provide all the answers.92
iV. thE rOLE Of saVings CLaUsEs in prEEMptiOn
 Congress is permitted to use CERCLA to preempt state law if it chooses to do 
so.93 There are three ways in which federal statutes can preempt state laws. First, 
there is “express preemption,” whereby Congress expressly states its intention to 
preempt state law in a given area.94 Second, there is “field preemption,” where the 
federal scheme is “sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation”95 in a particular policy 
area. Lastly, there is “conflict preemption,” where state law is preempted only to the 
extent that it conflicts with federal law, and where “compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility.”96
 New York courts agree that state claims for recovery of cleanup costs are not 
preempted by express or field preemption. The controversy surrounds the issue of 
whether state claims are in direct conflict with federal CERCLA provisions and 
91. The Court expressly chose not to answer this question. In describing how a party may recover costs 
incurred under a consent decree, the court commented:
 In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the 
costs of another party. We do not decide whether these compelled costs of response are 
recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a), or both. For our purposes, it suffices to demonstrate 
that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of 
reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement are 
recoverable only under § 113(f). Thus, at a minimum, neither remedy swallows the 
other.
 Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S at 139 n.6.
92. See Winston & Strawn LLP, Supreme Court Allows CERCLA PRPs to Sue For Cost Recovery After 
Voluntary Cleanup, Envtl. Prac., June 2007, http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/US_
AtlanticResearchCorp.pdf. Relegated to a footnote in Atlantic Research Corp., consent decrees and 
section 106 cleanup orders are common. Id. at 2. By not rendering a decision as to whether these costs 
are recoverable under sections 107(a) or 113(f), many PRPs “will therefore be faced with substantial 
uncertainty, not only as to which cause of action they can assert, but when they must assert it, because 
Sections 107(a) and Section 113(f) have different statutory limitations periods.” Id.
93. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
94. See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1998); New York v. Ametek, 473 F. Supp. 2d 
432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., No. 3:03-CV-
0438, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35141, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 11, 2007). 
95. Bedford, 156 F.3d at 426 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
713 (1985)).
96. Id. (quoting Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
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should therefore be preempted.97 Based on CERCLA’s statutory language and the 
various rulings of New York federal district courts, it is clear that not all state claims 
should be preempted. Only state claims that interfere with the federal contribution 
scheme or allow for double recovery under federal and state laws are in conflict with 
CERCLA. State claims that allow for recovery unavailable under or supplemental to 
federal law should not be preempted.
 Congressional intent is the most important factor in determining whether a 
federal statute preempts state law.98 Statutory language is a prime indicator of 
congressional intent, and “savings clauses” sprinkled throughout CERCLA indicate 
that Congress did not intend for federal law to preempt all state law claims in this 
area.99 In fact, Congress repeatedly included reminders in CERCLA that federal 
actions are not the only claims available to plaintiffs who have financed environmental 
cleanups.
 The language of section 113(f)(1) states that “[n]othing in this subsection shall 
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of 
a civil action under section 106 or section 107.”100 This section deals with contribution 
actions brought by a PRP after it has been sued by the government, and indicates 
that the section was not intended to affect other state or federal actions brought by 
private parties that have not been sued under sections 106 or 107. Therefore, when a 
party is innocent in the eyes of the government, CERCLA should not preempt any 
state claims a plaintiff may bring for cost recovery or contribution unless the state 
claims allow for double recovery.
 Most notable is the federal commencement rule, which sets a statute of limitations 
on state law actions for exposure to hazardous substances in section 309(a).101 
Subsection (a)(1) deals with exceptions to state statutes.102 This section states that if a 
state action for personal injury or property damage has a statute of limitations with a 
commencement date earlier than the federally required commencement date, the 
federal date controls.103 This indicates that when Congress wants to preempt state 
hazardous waste cleanup laws, it does so explicitly. Not only does CERCLA lack 
language expressly preempting all state law claims for cost recovery, the savings 
97. See Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 426; Ametek, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 433–34; N.Y. State Elec. & Gas, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31–33.
98. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137–38 (1990); State v. Hickey’s Carting, 
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
99. See, e.g., Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating “Congress did not intend 
for CERCLA remedies to preempt complementary state remedies”).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006).
102. Id.
103. Id; Downey Brand Attorneys LLP, CERCLA article, http://www.downeybrand.com/publications/
articles/041214_cercla.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
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clauses in CERCLA demonstrate that Congress specifically intended to allow state 
law remedies to exist alongside the federal cost-recovery scheme.104
V. ny caSE Law: cErcLa dOES nOT PrEEMPT aLL STaTE cLaiMS fOr rEcOVEry
 A. Disturbing the Federal Scheme in CERCLA Section 113(f)
 Several cases address the validity of New York state common law and statutory 
claims for recovery of costs expended in financing an environmental cleanup. One 
conclusion clearly emerges from the cases decided by New York’s district courts: state 
claims that do not disturb the federal contribution scheme in section 113(f) should 
not be preempted by CERCLA.
 Bedford Affiliates v. Sills was the first New York case to address the issue of 
whether a plaintiff who had financed a cleanup of hazardous waste could bring both 
CERCLA and state claims against defendants who may also be responsible for the 
waste.105 In that case, the plaintiff, Bedford, a general partnership, leased property in 
New York to corporations that constructed and operated dry-cleaning businesses.106 
Later, Bedford, under a consent order with NYDEC, cleaned up its property that 
the lessees had contaminated with hazardous dry-cleaning solvents.107 Plaintiff then 
brought claims against the lessees for cost recovery under CERCLA section 107(a)(4), 
and for contribution under section 113(f)(1), as well as state common law claims for 
restitution and indemnification.108
 The Second Circuit found that Bedford’s state claims were preempted by 
section 113(f)(1) and dismissed them.109 In the Second Circuit’s view, Congress had 
created section 113(f)(1) as an express right of contribution in order to expedite the 
resolution of environmental claims.110 The court stated that Congress had incorporated 
incentives into the statute for parties responsible for cleanups to settle their claims, 
and disincentives for such parties to refuse settlement.111 The court noted that PRPs 
who settle with the government gain immunity from other contribution suits asserted 
against them under section 113(f)(2), and retain the right to bring contribution 
actions against non-settling parties under section 113(f)(3).112 In addition, non-
settling parties may not seek contribution from settling parties, and may face 
104. The Second Circuit agreed, stating that CERCLA does not “prevent the states from enacting laws to 
supplement federal measures relating to the cleanup of such wastes.” Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 
426–27. 
105. See id. at 419.
106. Id. at 420.
107. Id. at 421–22.
108. Id. at 422.
109. Id. at 427.
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disproportionate liability.113 In the words of the Second Circuit, “it can easily be seen 
that instituting common law restitution and indemnification actions in state court 
would bypass this carefully crafted settlement system, creating an actual conflict 
therefore between CERCLA and state common law causes of action. Consequently, 
CERCLA preempts the state law remedies of restitution and indemnification.”114
 More recently, in 2007 the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of New York held that CERCLA preempted state law contribution claims by way of 
conflict preemption in New York State Electric and Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp.115 
Pursuant to a consent order from NYDEC, the New York State Electric and Gas 
Corp. (“NYSEGC”) cleaned up its sites that had been contaminated by the 
manufacture of gasoline.116 It then brought contribution claims under both CERCLA 
section 113(f)(1) and New York civil statute section 1401 to recover cleanup costs 
from FirstEnergy, a corporate successor to the properties that may have also 
contaminated the land.117 The court found that the state contribution claim was 
preempted by CERCLA because the contribution scheme outlined in section 113(f)
(1) may be undercut by state law and because of the possibility of double recovery. 
The court recognized the viability of contribution claims brought by PRPs who have 
previously been sued in a civil action under section 113(f)(1) and PRPs that have 
resolved their liability through administrative or judicially approved settlement under 
113(f)(3)(B), as well as cost recovery claims by parties against other PRPs that 
voluntarily cleaned sites under section 107(a)(4).118 The court found that section 1401 
contribution claims may provide recovery inconsistent with the CERCLA scheme 
and “would potentially undermine this scheme and permit recovery of duplicate 
113. Id. This may occur because the amount recoverable from non-settling parties is reduced only by the 
amount of settlement and is not limited to their share of the damages. Id. (citing CERCLA § 113(f)
(2)).
114. Id; see also In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997). In In re Reading Co., the court described 
the federal settlement scheme in section 113(f)(1) as follows:
The first part of the system grants protection from contribution actions to settling 
parties for actions arising from ‘matters addressed’ in a consent decree. The second part 
limits the settlement’s effect to a reduction in the aggregate liability of the remaining 
PRPs. Because settlement reduces the total amount recoverable from the remaining, 
non-settling parties only by the amount of settlement, non-settling PRPs remain liable 
for the balance of the aggregate environmental liability. Consequently, PRPs who 
choose to settle gain protection from contribution, enjoy favorable settlement terms, 
and retain the ability to seek contribution from other defendants. PRPs, who choose 
not to settle, are barred from seeking contribution from the settling PRPs and thus face 
potentially disproportionate liability. This system gives the United States obvious and 
important leverage to encourage quick and effective resolution of environmental 
disputes.
 Id.
115. No. 3:03-CV-0438, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35141, at *3.
116. Id. at *3–4.
117. Id. at *6–7.
118. See id. at *36.
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damages, or contribution where none is available under CERCLA,” and therefore 
ruled that the state claim was precluded by conflict preemption.119
 Conversely, in State v. Ametek, Inc., decided just a few months before FirstEnergy, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that 
the plaintiff ’s state law claims were not preempted by CERCLA.120 In Ametek, the 
state brought both CERCLA section 107 claims and state claims of restitution and 
public nuisance to recover costs incurred in response to the release of hazardous 
substances at a state compost site.121 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 
state’s claims on the ground that they were automatically preempted by 
CERCLA.122
 The Ametek court denied the defendant’s motion and stated that the defendant 
could not rely on the preemption found in Bedford because, unlike the plaintiff in 
Bedford who sued under 113(f)(1), the Ametek plaintiff sued under section 107(a)(4).123 
In the words of the court, “the Bedford Affiliates Court’s concerns are not implicated 
in actions for recovery brought under section 107.”124
 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reached 
the same conclusion in State v. Hickey’s Carting, Inc.125 After cleaning up hazardous 
waste at a state landfill, the state brought claims against Hickey’s Carting and others 
under section 107(a)(4), as well as under state common law theories of unjust 
enrichment, subrogation, and implied indemnity for recovery of its response costs.126 
Like the court in Ametek, the Eastern District noted that the reasoning behind 
Bedford did not apply to the section 107(a) claim brought by the state in that case.127 
In Hickey’s Carting, Inc., the parties involved were not PRPs with government claims 
to settle, but “innocent” parties with no prior liability to the government. Thus, the 
court held that because settlements between the government and a PRP “are intended 
to resolve a PRP’s liability to the government and usually contain releases and 
covenants not to sue for costs arising out of the same hazardous waste cleanup” there 
was no fear that the government would, after settling with a PRP, sue the same party 
under common law.128 The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the state 
claims, finding that the state claims were not preempted by CERCLA.129
119. Id. at *36–37.
120. State v. Ametek, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
121. Id. 
122. Id.
123. Id. at 434.
124. Id.
125. 380 F. Supp. 2d 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
126. Id. at 110–11.
127. See id. at 113.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 121.
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 Because only parties that have performed voluntary cleanups bring section 107(a) 
cost recovery claims, there is no danger of state actions for recovery disrupting the 
federal settlement scheme designed to compel parties to settle with the federal 
government. Other state claims for contribution that do not disrupt the scheme 
created under section 113(f)(1) should also not be preempted by that section.
 B. Double Recovery
 Congress made clear in CERCLA that plaintiffs could not recover compensation 
for the same cleanup costs under both state law and under section 114(b).130 Through 
this provision, Congress implicitly allows state claims by limiting recovery under 
state law to amounts not recovered under federal law. Implied is the notion that so 
long as state and federal recovery do not overlap, CERCLA does not preclude a 
plaintiff ’s recovery under both state and federal causes of action.131
 Perhaps Congress decided to allow supplemental recovery under state claims 
because the federal statutes severely limit the costs a plaintiff may recover from other 
responsible parties. Under section 107(a)(4), PRPs are liable only for four categories 
of costs.132 These are: (a) costs of removal of hazardous waste or remedial action 
taken by the state that are not consistent with the NCP, (b) other response costs 
incurred by any other person consistent with the NCP, (c) natural resource damage, 
and (d) costs of health studies or assessments conducted pursuant to section 104(i).133
 Essentially, the only costs a private party can recover are those “consistent” with 
the NCP under section 107(a)(4)(B).134 Similarly, under section 113(f)(1), parties can 
only collect contribution for response costs covered under the NCP.135 The NCP 
defines “consistent” response costs as those considered “necessary”136 when the 
response action, evaluated as a whole, is in “substantial compliance” with certain 
procedural requirements of the NCP and “results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup.”137 
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (2006). Section 9614(b) explicitly precludes double recovery, stating:
 Any person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant 
to this Act shall be precluded from recovering compensation for the same removal costs 
or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal law. Any person who 
receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other 
Federal or State law shall be precluded from receiving compensation for the same 
removal costs or damages or claims as provided in this Act.
 Id.
131. See id.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
133. Id.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-78.
136. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(2) (2008). 
137. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i). 
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A government plaintiff, on the other hand, may recover “all response costs” it incurred 
that are “not inconsistent with the NCP.”138
 The NCP thus narrows the types of response costs that private parties may 
recover under federal law. Courts generally do not find PRPs liable under CERCLA 
for personal injury, property damage, or medical monitoring costs.139 State common 
law claims like nuisance, indemnification, and unjust enrichment are also not usually 
found to be “consistent” response costs under the NCP.140 Indeed, federal recovery 
for private parties is very restricted; they may “only recover their costs incurred in 
response to releases of hazardous substances.”141
 Private plaintiffs have the added burden of establishing consistency with the 
NCP.142 This may be difficult because CERCLA fails to clearly define what 
recoverable “response costs” are.143 Instead, CERCLA offers a broad definition for 
two types of “responses,” which take the forms of “removal” and “remedial” actions.144 
A removal action is one that is “necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damages 
to the public health or welfare as to the environment.”145 A remedial action is taken 
to “prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not 
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or 
the environment.”146 But these vague definitions provide little help to plaintiffs who 
must prove that their response costs fall into one of these categories in order to 
recover these costs under federal law.
 CERCLA legislation deals with cleaning up hazardous waste and its provisions 
provide claims for recovery of cleanup costs. Defendants should not be allowed to use 
CERCLA as a shield against state claims that are unrelated to the cleanup process 
and provide supplemental recovery. State claims for property damage or nuisance, for 
example, do not interfere with cleanup activities or the federal recovery system147 and 
138. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(1); Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-78. 
139. New York Virtual Environment Law Center, Superfunds (CERCLA & State Superfund), 28, http://
www.nyenvlaw.com/Data/Documents/Chapter%208.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2010); see also Schnapf, 
supra note 8, at 5-44 to -46. “It is important to note that CERCLA does not provide a remedy to 
recovery for private property damage or personal injury claims.” Id. at 5-44.
140. See State v. Hickey’s Carting, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116–19 (2005) (discussing how state claims that 
do not conf lict with CERCLA’s NCP requirements, meaning claims that allow recovery for costs 
inconsistent with the NCP, should not be preempted by CERCLA).
141. Schnapf, supra note 8, at 5-44.
142. Id. at 5-50. 
143. See id. at 5-45.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (2006). 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
147. A recent interesting case supporting this theory is Sher v. Raytheon Co., No. 8:08-cv-889-T-26TGW, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74998 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2008). The residential property owners brought state 
claims of trespass, private nuisance, unjust enrichment, strict liability, negligence, and medical 
monitoring for toxic groundwater contamination the defendant produced at the site. Id. at *3–4. The 
defendant had already begun cleanup planning with the Florida Department of Environmental 
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should be considered outside the realm of CERCLA in order to encourage the 
cleanup of New York’s land for reuse and redevelopment by ensuring that parties are 
able to bring state actions for recovery of costs not actionable under CERCLA. New 
York should encourage private parties to clean up state land by allowing them to 
bring state claims for damages not considered “necessary” and “consistent” with the 
NCP and therefore not recoverable under either sections 107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f)(1).
 New York courts that have allowed plaintiffs to bring both CERCLA and state 
recovery claims have noted that double recovery is not possible. In Ametek, for 
example, the court pointed out that the plaintiff ’s different actions would not lead to 
double recovery under federal and state law.148 The court noted that “the set of 
damages recoverable by the State under [section] 107(a) are not identical to the set of 
damages recoverable under state law.”149 The Ametek court allowed the state claims 
because they could provide recovery to the plaintiff that was either not available 
under CERCLA or supplemental to the federal recovery.150
 The court in Hickey’s Carting similarly dispelled the double-recovery argument 
for preemption of state claims.151 The court noted that state and federal claims may 
have different elements, creating the possibility that a plaintiff could make out a 
successful case for a state claim but fail to satisfy each element of the federal cause of 
action.152 In that case, a plaintiff would be prejudiced if it were unable to recover 
costs under the state claim due to a dismissal on preemption grounds.153 In denying 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the state claims, the court agreed with the plaintiff ’s 
argument that it would be “premature to say at this juncture that the state claims 
conflict . . . when there has been, as of yet, no recovery to be duplicated and there 
remains the potential that Plaintiff may not be able to recover all of its costs from 
each cause of action.”154
 In sum, only certain state claims are preempted by CERCLA—those that 
interfere with the federal settlement scheme in section 113(f) or allow for double 
recovery under state and federal law. New York courts should allow plaintiffs to 
Protection (“FDEP”) and argued that under the “doctrine of primary jurisdiction” the FDEP should 
decide its liability to the plaintiffs. Id. at *4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in situations 
“where the expertise of an administrative body would benefit the courts in deciding a particular issue or 
dispute because the dispute requires the exercise of knowledge gained outside the realm of a judge’s 
experience.” Id. at *8–9. See generally Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The 
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1039, 1043–44 (2008). In Sher, however, the court refused to apply the doctrine, ruling that the 
plaintiff ’s state claims were not interfering with the enforcement of Florida’s pollution laws. See Sher, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74998, at *12.
148. See Ametek, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See Hickey’s Carting, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
152. See id. at 115.
153. See id. at 114.
154. Id. at 115.
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recover costs not available under CERCLA or supplemental to CERCLA remedies 
under state causes of action in order to encourage private environmental cleanups of 
state land.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 The administration of environmental cleanups is an important area of the law, 
and if it had intended to, Congress could have manifested a clear intent to usurp all 
law-making decisions from the states in this area. But Congress did not evidence 
such intent. Instead, Congress drafted CERCLA to specifically allow state claims as 
alternative and supplemental routes of recovery for parties that have performed 
cleanup activities. State claims that do not interfere with the federal settlement 
scheme in section 113(f)(1)—meaning claims that do not discourage PRPs from 
settling their liability with the government and do not allow for double recovery 
under state and federal law—should not be preempted by CERCLA.
 The policy allowing a party to take advantage of a state’s law when it provides a 
significant service to the state is sound. When the NYSEGC performed its civic 
duty and cleaned up the dangerous contamination caused by its manufacture of gas, 
it should have been allowed to bring state claims that were unavailable under federal 
law to recover expenditures from other PRPs. Allowing a party to bring both state 
and federal recovery claims would encourage large corporations like the NYSEGC, 
as well as smaller entities, to clean up New York’s land, making it safer for residents 
and viable for new uses. New York courts should embrace a policy of promoting 
environmental cleanups by opening the door to state claims as alternative routes of 
recovery to federal claims. Otherwise, innocent parties—namely, taxpayers—end up 
incurring the costs of cleanups performed with Superfund money. A non-preemption 
interpretation rewards parties who do the right thing and puts those who abandon 
contaminated property at risk for future liability.
